Abstract. This paper analyzes the dynamic response of loans to the private sector and of economic activity to aggregate supply, demand and monetary policy shocks in Germany and the euro area based on a standard macroeconomic VAR using sign restrictions to identify the structural shocks. The main results of this analysis are that (i) with the exception of the response to the supply shock in Germany, the response of loans to the three macroeconomic shocks is rather weak and in most cases insignificant; (ii) the 2000-05 credit slowdown and weak economic performance in Germany were primarily driven by adverse supply shocks; and (iii) the marked slowdown in credit creation in Germany over this period actually represents a realignment of the outstanding stock of loans with its deterministic level. In order to assess the role of bank lending in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks, we further perform counterfactual simulations and analyze the dynamic responses of German loan subaggregates in order to test the distributional implications of potential credit market frictions. These exercises do not indicate that credit market frictions play an amplifying role in the transmission of macroeconomic fluctuations.
INTRODUCTION
Bank loans are the most important external financing source for the private sector in the euro area and its member countries 1 and constitute the largest counterpart to the broad monetary aggregate M3, which plays an important role in the Eurosystems' assessment of medium-to long-run risks to price stability in the euro area. Boom and bust cycles in credit markets have in the past often preceded or coincided with asset price bubbles, and have in many cases been followed by instabilities in financial sectors.
2 As a result, the monitoring of the development of bank loans and the analysis of its driving forces is an important source of information for the assessment of the future outlook for inflation, economic activity and financial stability.
The empirical literature suggests that an expansion of economic activity (driven, for instance, by a positive demand or supply shock), a reduction of interest rates or a properly identified expansionary monetary policy shock has a positive effect on bank lending.
3,4 However, there is no empirical study yet that has attempted to disentangle the effects of rigorously identified supply, demand and monetary policy shocks. Our first contribution is to fill this gap by analyzing the response and role of bank lending in the transmission of these three basic macro shocks and their contribution to the developments in credit markets and the overall economy in Germany and the euro area.
The focus on Germany and the euro area is of particular interest in this context because of the divergent performance of the German and the euroarea economies in the first half of the new millennium. While the euro area was characterized by, on average, modest economic expansion and strong credit growth, the German economy was characterized by a protracted weakness in economic activity, which was accompanied by a virtual halt in credit creation. There has been disagreement about the causes of Germany's dismal economic development. While some observers have argued that it is mainly attributable to weak aggregate demand (e.g. Horn, 2003) , others have argued that it is mainly caused by weaknesses on the supply side of the economy (e.g. Sachverständigenrat, 2002) . The unprecedented developments in credit markets had further raised concerns that low credit growth could not only reflect weak economic activity but also cut-backs in credit supply that have contributed actively to the weak economic activity. More specifically, there was a worry that the economic slowdown and sharp drop in asset prices since 2000 could have eroded the banking sector's capital base to such an extent that it has resulted in a credit crunch that compounded the slowdown (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2005) . There is -to our knowledge -no study yet that has explored the causes of the divergent development of the German and the euro-area economies and the competing hypothesis on the causes of the German slump in a rigorous analytical way. The second contribution of the present paper therefore is to address these issues based on a historical decomposition of economic activity and lending in Germany and the euro area.
The analysis is based on a standard macroeconomic VAR comprising real GDP, GDP deflator inflation, the short-term nominal interest rate and the real stock of outstanding bank loans, estimated over the 1985-2005 period using quarterly data. Aggregate supply, aggregate demand and monetary policy shocks are identified using theoretically motivated short-run sign restrictions on the impulse response functions. We assess the patterns of the responses of economic activity, prices, interest rates and bank lending to the three identified macroeconomic shocks as well as the contribution of the three shocks to fluctuations in output, prices, interest rates and bank lending over time based on historical decompositions. Unfortunately, it is not possible to disentangle loan supply and loan demand reactions to these shocks because credit supply and credit demand are not directly observable. We can, at best, obtain some indirect indications of the presence of loan supply effects being at work. For this purpose, we perform counterfactual simulations based on the estimated VARs. By switching off the response of bank lending to macro shocks and thus any repercussions on the macroeconomic variables running via bank lending, we attempt to obtain tentative evidence on the amplifying role of loans in the propagation of macroeconomic shocks at the aggregate level. Similar exercises have been performed earlier in order to assess the role of systematic monetary policy in the propagation of oil-price shocks (Bernanke et al., 1997) or the presence of loan supply effects in the propagation of monetary policy shocks (Ashcraft, 2006) in the United States.
The analysis of the paper is complemented by an investigation of the dynamic responses of lending by different banking groups and of different sectoral loan aggregates. Because of data unavailability for the euro area, this part of the analysis is confined to Germany. The German banking sector is characterized by the coexistence of different kinds of credit institutions, comprising inter alia large commercial banks, small regional commercial banks, a publicly owned savings banks sector and a cooperative sector characterized by the principle of mutuality. At the sectoral level, there are data available distinguishing between loans to households, loans to enterprises and loans to self-employed. We extend the German macro VAR by adding each of the loan subaggregates to the model one at a time and comparing its impulse responses with those of aggregate bank lending. The credit channel -which stresses an active role of the financial system for economic activity -suggests that differences in the size of borrowers or lenders matter for the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations on bank lending based on the conjecture that informational frictions and moral hazard problems and thus credit constraints are more relevant for smaller banks and borrowers. 5 This would imply that lending by small banks and lending to small borrowers responds stronger to macroeconomic shocks. On the other hand, the German financial system is characterized by close borrower-lender relationships, the so-called Hausbankenprinzip (Ehrmann and Worms, 2004) . It is often argued that this principle leads banks to isolate their customers from macroeconomic volatility, which would result in a small responsiveness of bank lending to macroeconomic shocks. The Hausbankenprinzip might well be more relevant for small credit institutions operating at the regional level than for large banks, which would be reflected in a weaker response of small banks' lending to macro shocks. Furthermore, close interbank links in the German banking groups may enable small banks to overcome possible funding constraints . Finally, it is often argued that savings banks and Landesbanks do not act in a profit-maximizing way because of their public status, which would imply that lending by these two banking groups responds less to macroeconomic fluctuations. These considerations suggest that the results must be interpreted carefully and that a negative finding must ultimately not be interpreted as evidence against the presence of bank lending channel effects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the dataset. Section 3 presents the empirical model and the estimation technique applied. Section 4 provides the empirical results with the impulse response functions to the structural shocks, the historical decompositions and the results of our counterfactual experiment. Section 5 presents the results of the analysis of the German loan subaggregates. Section 6 concludes.
DATA
We use quarterly seasonally adjusted data for real GDP, GDP deflator inflation, the three-month money market rate and real loans to the private non-bank sector over the period 1985Q1-2005Q3. In principle, it would have been possible to extend the sample period back to 1980, 6 but we chose a somewhat shorter sample period mainly for two reasons: first, in order to exclude the disinflation and the drop in macroeconomic volatility that occurred in the first half of the 1980s; and, second, in order to take into account the deregulation of financial systems that occurred in many euroarea countries in the 1970s and early 1980s and that has probably altered the link between bank lending and the macroeconomy (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008; Goodhart et al., 2004) .
For Germany, the series for real GDP, the GDP deflator and total loans were linked to the corresponding series for West Germany in 1991Q1. The euroarea data for real GDP, the GDP deflator and the short-term nominal interest rate were taken from the ECB database and linked to the corresponding series from the ECB's Area Wide Model database in 1995Q1. The seasonally adjusted series for private sector loans from the ECB website was spliced with the series constructed by Calza et al. (2001) in 1991Q1. Real loans were constructed by deflating nominal loans with the GDP deflator. GDP deflator inflation is measured as the quarter-on-quarter change in the GDP deflator.
The raw series are shown in Figure 1 . The graphs illustrate the convergence of nominal interest rates in the euro area in the run-up to EMU in the 1990s, but also the significant divergence in economic performance between the German and the euro-area economies over recent years. While the euro area was characterized by, on average, modest economic expansion and inflation, Germany experienced an unprecedented slowdown in economic activity and very low rates of aggregate price inflation. The differences in bank lending developments over recent years are even more pronounced. In the euro area the expansion of real loans to the private sector slowed down between 2000 and 2004 and has accelerated again since 2004. In contrast to this, credit creation in Germany has come to a virtual standstill since 2000 and the outstanding stock of loans to the private sector has declined in real terms since 2000.
METHODOLOGY
The log level of real GDP, GDP deflator inflation, interest rates and the log level of real loans are collected in the N( 5 4)-dimensional vector Y t . It is assumed that Y t has a VAR( p) representation:
with
7 Unit root tests suggest that all series included in the VAR model are integrated of order one. We estimate the VAR in levels since differencing generally leads to the loss of information on long-run relationships between the variables. However, we are interested only in the short-run dynamics and therefore do not consider cointegration between the series.
The matrix Q is chosen such that the innovations v t are orthonormal. The shocks w t are related to v t through the structural equation
where R 0 R ¼ I N . Provided that there are sufficient identifying restrictions on R, the structural shocks w t can be recovered from the VAR innovations. The N Â N matrix of impulse response functions to the shocks w t ¼ ðw 1t ; . . . ; w Nt Þ 0 at horizon h, @Y tþh =@w
Our ultimate goal is to identify the structural shocks w t and to assess the impulse responses of the individual variables to these shocks. For this purpose, we fit a VAR(2) model to Y t . The lag order of the VAR model was determined on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. In order to estimate v t from the vector of residuals of the fitted VAR, an eigenvalueeigenvector decomposition is performed, but any other orthogonalization, such as a Cholesky decomposition, would work as well. Letv t denote the resulting vector of orthogonal innovations.
The structural shocks w t can be recovered from v t by imposing identifying restrictions that are incorporated into the matrix R. We aim at estimating an aggregate supply shock, an aggregate real demand shock and a monetary policy shock. This is achieved by applying an identification scheme proposed recently by Faust (1998) and Uhlig (2005) for monetary policy shocks and extended to other macroeconomic shocks by Canova and De Nicoló (2003) , Peersman (2005) and Peersman and Straub (2006) . This identification scheme consists of imposing short-run sign restrictions on impulse responses. This method has the advantage of being relatively agnostic, i.e. it implies a smaller probability of 'creating' certain results by imposing strong a priori restrictions like, for instance, long-run or zero restrictions, which are often used in the structural VAR literature. The latter, in addition, are at odds with some theoretical models (see the discussions in in Peersman, 2005) . The confidence bands were constructed based on bootstrap techniques. More details on the identification of the shocks and the bootstrap are given in Appendix A.
We impose the following restrictions, which are also summarized in Table 1 . A positive supply shock has non-negative effects on output and nonpositive effects on prices. A demand shock moves output, prices and interest rates in the same direction. An expansionary monetary policy shock does not increase the interest rate and does not lower output and prices.
8 These restrictions are imposed on the contemporaneous and one-and two-quartersahead reactions of the variables. They are fairly standard in the empirical literature using sign restrictions and are consistent with the standard aggregate supply-aggregate demand framework and with more complex structural models such as the DSGE model developed by Smets and Wouters (2003) . 9 The effects of the shocks on bank lending are left unrestricted for three reasons. First, they are the main objects of investigation and restricting them would not be appropriate. Second, such restrictions are not needed to Notes: Restrictions are imposed contemporaneously and on the first two quarters after the shock. '?' indicates no restriction.
8. These are the restrictions also imposed by Farrant and Peersman (2005) and Peersman and Straub (2006) to identify supply, real demand and monetary policy shocks. 9. Obviously, like any other empirical VAR study, we are restricted to the analyses of a much smaller set of structural shocks because of the dimensionality limitations inherent in VAR analysis. The results of the simulation of the Smets and Wouters (2003) model by Peersman and Straub (2006, disentangle the three shocks we wish to identify. Finally, they are not clear from a theoretical point of view. On the one hand, a positive aggregate demand shock may cause credit demand to rise as part of an increase in aggregate income or if demand is financed via bank lending. A positive supply shock may also have a positive effect on credit demand, because increased productivity and profitability also stimulate investment and consumption and thereby possibly also the demand for loans (see e.g. Kashyap et al., 1993 ). An expansionary monetary policy shock may stimulate credit demand directly by lowering the cost of financing and indirectly via its potentially expansionary effect on economic activity. These credit demand reactions may be reinforced by credit supply reactions arising from asymmetric information problems in credit markets. 10 On the other hand, there are also arguments suggesting that the correlation between the three macroeconomic shocks we consider and bank lending may be negative. Households and firms may want to smooth the effect of such shocks on consumption and investment, for example by increasing bank lending after a negative shock. In the case of firms, it may also be the case that they adjust the mix between internal and external financing depending on their cashflow position, increasing the share of internal financing when cash flow is high following expansionary macroeconomic shocks and vice versa (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Friedman and Kuttner, 1993) .
Finally, we leave the fourth shock in the system unidentified, so that it takes up all variation in the data that is not explained by the three identified shocks. The fourth shock therefore acts as a buffer or residual shock capturing all the effects of shocks not characterized by the sign restrictions presented in Table 1 . The impulse responses to this fourth shock, which are available on request, are in fact very short-lived and insignificant. 
MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS AND BANK LENDING

Impulse response analysis and historical decomposition
The impulse responses of the four endogenous variables in the VAR to the identified structural shocks are shown in Figures 2 and 3. We report the mean impulse responses and 90% bootstrapped confidence bands. Loans to the non-financial private sector increase in response to the supply shocks andafter a small delay -to the monetary policy shocks. However, while the impulse responses are insignificant in the euro area, they are significant in Germany. In particular, the German loan response to the supply shock is highly significant and persistent. In both Germany and the euro area, the responses to the demand shocks are insignificant. On the whole, with the exception of the response to the supply shock in Germany, the response of loans to the three macroeconomic shocks is rather weak and in most cases insignificant. In light of the considerations in the previous section, this finding is not overly surprising since, as we have pointed out, from a theoretical point of view, there are reasons for both a positive and a negative response of loans to macroeconomic disturbances. Furthermore, as we have already mentioned in Section 1, the financial systems of Germany and other euro-area countries are characterized by close borrower-lender relationships, the so-called Hausbankenprinzip (Ehrmann et al., 2003) , which may induce banks to isolate their customers from macroeconomic fluctuations and explain the weak responsiveness of bank lending to macroeconomic shocks.
The responses of output, prices and interest rates are broadly in line with the existing evidence (e.g. Peersman, 2005) and are similar in Germany and the euro area, with a few exceptions. The response of output to the supply shock is stronger in Germany than in the euro area. German output also exhibits a more persistent response to the monetary policy shock. The demand shock triggers a permanent response of prices in Germany, but a temporary response in the euro area. Finally, interest rates increase with a delay after the supply shock in the euro area, whereas the corresponding impulse response function is insignificant in Germany.
12
The variance decompositions of the one-and the five-years-ahead forecast errors are reported in Table 2 . The reported figures state the mean of the relative contribution of each of the three shocks to the forecast error of each of the four variables in the VAR. 13 The results suggest that three shocks can explain the bulk of the variations in output, prices, interest rates and loans in Notes: Impulse responses to shocks of one standard deviation in size. Mean, solid; 90% confidence bands, dotted. Output is real GDP, prices the GDP deflator, interest rates the three-month money market rate and loans are real private loans.
12. Most SVAR-based empirical work restricts the contemporaneous response of output to monetary policy shocks to zero (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Bernanke et al., 2005; Peersman, 2005 , in the section where he uses traditional restrictions). This leads -by construction -to transmission lags of monetary policy shocks on output and has substantially shaped the conventional wisdom. Sign restrictions-based analyses (e.g. Eickmeier and Breitung, 2006; Peersman, 2005) yield immediate responses of output after monetary policy shocks, and the results we obtain are in line with this literature. More precisely, we obtain a German impulse response that exhibits the largest impact contemporaneously and that is short-lived. By contrast, the corresponding euro-area impulse response function reaches its maximum after roughly 1.5 years and turns insignificant two years after the shock. 13. Focusing on the median instead of the mean does not yield qualitatively different results.
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r 2009 The Authors 202 the two economies. In Germany, the supply shock explains the largest part of the forecast error of output over both the short and the medium term. The demand shock is the dominant factor driving the variation of prices and interest rates at medium-term horizons (up to five years). The monetary policy shock is relatively unimportant. In the euro area, on the other hand, in general, the contribution of supply and demand shocks to the forecast error variances is smaller, while that of the monetary policy shock is higher. These results reflect the differences in the dynamic effects of supply, demand and monetary policy shocks, the former two having stronger effects in Germany and the latter having more persistent effects in the euro area. Loans in Germany are mainly driven by supply shocks, which explain more than half of the forecast error at both short and medium horizons, and yet the role of demand and monetary policy shocks, which account for more than 10% of the loans' variation, is not negligible, either. For the euro area, all three shocks have similar explanatory power, with variance shares ranging from 22% to 27% at medium forecast horizons.
The identified supply, demand and monetary policy shocks for Germany and the euro area are presented in Figures 4 and 5. The graphs show that, over the EMU period, both Germany and the euro area have been affected by a sequence of positive supply shocks in the period 1999-2001, followed (especially in the case of Germany) by a sequence of predominantly negative supply shocks thereafter. The sequence of demand shocks since the start of EMU is broadly balanced in Germany, whereas there have been mainly negative demand shocks in the euro area from 1999 till 2003 and mainly positive shocks since 2004. The sequence of monetary policy shocks over recent years is broadly balanced in both Germany and the euro area, which contradicts the claim that the German economy has been exposed to an overly tight monetary policy since the start of EMU.
14 In order to assess the driving forces of the dynamic evolution of the four variables under investigation, especially over the more recent time period, we present in Figures 6 and 7 the historical decomposition of the four time series Note: Mean point estimates (after having randomly drawn rotation angles between 0 and p until 500 draws that satisfied the identifying restrictions were saved).
14. It should be noted in this context that we interpret a monetary policy shock as a deviation of the short-term interest rate from its estimated response to output, prices and the other variables in the VAR. As a result, we obtain different monetary policy shock series for Germany and the euro area, although there was a common monetary policy since the start of EMU, and arguably also before the start of EMU with the Bundesbank as the de facto nominal anchor of the European Monetary System. An alternative, stricter view would be to interpret a monetary policy shock as a deviation of interest rates from the estimated reaction function of the monetary authority. We do not follow this approach as it is, in our view, not tractable. In order to avoid mixing up the two monetary regimes before and after 1999, the analysis for Germany would have to be based on a VAR estimated until the end of 1998 and the analysis for the euro area would have to be based on a VAR estimated starting in 1999, a sample way too short for VAR analysis.
S. Eickmeier et al. The graphs reveal that the recent weak economic performance of Germany was primarily driven by adverse supply shocks. These adverse supply shocks also contributed to recent inflation developments that increased somewhat from a previously low level. The historical decomposition of the evolution of bank loans reveals that the slowdown in credit creation over the last few years actually represents a realignment of the outstanding stock of loans with its deterministic level, and that the supply shock was essentially the sole driver of the development of the accumulated forecast error for German loans. For the euro area, the historical decompositions suggest that the recent dynamic evolution of output, prices, interest rates and loans was also shaped to a large extent by the effect of supply shocks. Demand and monetary policy shocks had mutually offsetting effects. Interestingly, the historical decomposition suggests that despite its very recent accelerated expansion, the stock of loans to the private sector in the euro area is still below its long-term deterministic level. 
A counterfactual experiment
Based on the estimated VARs, we can obtain tentative evidence regarding the relevance of systematic bank loan supply effects by running counterfactual simulations that switch off the shock response of bank lending and thereby any repercussions on the macroeconomic variables in the system. In principle, an amplification of shocks may only arise as a consequence of loan supply reactions, but not of passive loan demand reactions. It therefore appears possible to detect the presence or absence of loan supply effects by comparing the unconstrained impulse responses of the other macro variables in the system, in particular real GDP, with the impulse response when the response of loans, and thus any repercussions thereof on the other variables, is switched off.
15
In order to switch off the potential amplifying effects of bank loans, we set all elements in the row of QR 0 that refers to the loan equation in the VAR model to zero while keeping the remaining coefficients fixed (thus setting the effects of the structural shocks on loans and therefore the impact of changes in loans on the macro variables to zero). Figure 8 shows the differences between the unconstrained and the resulting counterfactual impulse response functions. They indicate a positive contribution of lending to the spread of supply and monetary policy shocks throughout the German economy. However, only the transmission of supply shocks to German output is significantly enhanced through bank lending. Bank lending does not seem to play an active role in the transmission of demand shocks. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the euro area, where, however, loans appear to play no active (and significant) role in the response of output, prices and interest rates to all three macro shocks ( Figure 9 ). However, it should be noted that there are a number of caveats associated with this approach. In particular, the counterfactual experiment is not immune against the Lucas critique: changes of private sector expectations of the policy process that may result from policy changes and may alter the parameters of the model are not accounted for. Also, as has already been stressed by Bernanke (1993) , even if no amplifying role of loans were found, this would not necessarily imply that loans play no role, as its explanatory power may have been absorbed by other variables reflecting the monetary stance, in our case the interest rate. On the other hand, if loans were found to play a significant role in shaping the dynamic responses of the other variables, this may not necessarily imply that there are loan supply effects, as it may potentially also reflect loan demand reactions to anticipated future movements in output.
AN ANALYSIS BASED ON DISAGGREGATED GERMAN DATA
'Financial accelerator' effects via bank lending are generally difficult to detect in reduced-form macro models such as the VAR we analyzed in the previous sections, because they are observationally equivalent to the effects caused by other transmission channels (see e.g. Cecchetti, 1995) . In particular, as we have discussed above, the observed responses of aggregate bank lending to macroeconomic shocks can be due either to loan demand responses, loan supply responses or both. For this reason, the bulk of the empirical literature attempts to detect loan supply effects indirectly by testing the distributional implications of credit market imperfections. As we have already discussed in Mean, solid; 90% confidence bands, dotted. Output is real GDP, prices the GDP deflator, interest rates the three-month money market rate and loans are real private loans.
the introduction, informational frictions should fundamentally be more relevant for small borrowers and banks, which is a testable hypothesis. There are a large number of studies testing this hypothesis using disaggregated data for individual banks or firms using panel estimation techniques. For the United States, Gilchrist (1993, 1994) , for instance, present evidence suggesting that bank loans are shifted from small to large firms when monetary policy is tightened, while Stein (1995, 2000) , among others, find that lending by small banks contracts more sharply than lending by large banks after a monetary contraction. For the euro-area countries, the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy shocks has been analyzed in depth in the Eurosystem 'Monetary Transmission Network' (MTN). 16 The MTN studies found no evidence that the response of bank lending depends on the size or the capitalization of banks and thus little support for the hypothesis of a 'financial accelerator' via bank lending. For some euro-area countries, especially Germany, this finding can be attributed to close interbank links, bank networks and close, long-term relationships between borrowers and lenders, which Mean, solid; 90% confidence bands, dotted. Output is real GDP, prices the GDP deflator, interest rates the three-month money market rate and loans are real private loans.
16. The complete set of studies produced by the MTN is published in Ehrmann et al. (2003) . The use of disaggregated individual bank data is not an option here: the sample period for which these data are available is too short for a reasonable time-series analysis. 18 An alternative approach to test the relevance of 'financial accelerator' effects using time-series techniques is to test for differences in the responses of loan subaggregates. This is the approach we pursue in the following. However, due to data unavailability for the euro area, the analysis is confined to Germany.
Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Bank Lending
The German banking sector is characterized by the coexistence of various types of banks with rather different characteristics. The broadest distinction can be made between universal banks, which offer a broad range of services, and specialized banks such as mortgage banks and development banks. In the following, we focus on the universal banking sector, which accounts for about 75% of the German banking sector in terms of total assets and for about 80% of outstanding loans to the private non-bank sector. 19 The universal banking sector is composed of three pillars: the commercial banking sector, the savings banks sector and the credit cooperative sector. The commercial banking sector is privately owned and comprises the five big banks (Grobanken), 20 the regional banks (Regionalbanken) and the branches of foreign banks. The savings banks sector is publicly owned and consists of the savings banks (Sparkassen) and the Landesbanks (Landesbanken), which act as clearing banks for the savings banks. Finally, the credit cooperative sector is based on the principle of mutuality and comprises the credit cooperatives (Kreditgenossenschaften) and the cooperative central banks (Girozentralen), which also act as clearing banks for the credit cooperatives. Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics on the different banking groups. We report for each banking group the number of institutions, the total assets, total lending to private non-banks and the average size, defined as total assets divided by the number of institutions, in 2005. The figures suggest that the banking groups and also each of the three pillars are characterized by substantial heterogeneities in terms of size. With an average size of more than h100 million, the big banks, Landesbanks and cooperative central banks are substantially larger than the regional banks (h3,800 million), the savings banks (h2,200 million) and, in particular, the credit cooperatives (h457 million). According to the size hypothesis, lending by the former three 17. See Ehrmann et al. (2003) and also Ehrmann and Worms (2004) and Hofmann and Worms (2006) . 18. The individual bank data for Germany used in the MTN study by Worms (2004) banking groups should respond more weakly to macroeconomic shocks than lending by the latter three banking groups. Kakes and Sturm (2002) and Küppers (2001) analyze whether there is a 'financial accelerator' of monetary policy shocks via bank loans ('bank lending channel') based on a VAR framework using data starting in the late 1960s or mid-1970s and ending in the mid/late 1990s. Differences in the responses of lending by different banking groups are assessed by estimating separate VARs for each banking group. However, the two studies fail to come to consistent conclusions. While Küppers finds no evidence of bank lending channel effects in Germany, Kakes and Sturm conclude that their results provide support for the existence of a bank lending channel.
We also attempt to test the size hypothesis on the borrower's side by assessing differences in the response of lending to different sectors of the economy, differentiating between enterprises, households and self-employed persons. 21 Although no balance-sheet data exist to demonstrate differences in size formally, it seems reasonable to conjecture that self-employed persons and households are on average smaller and also more limited in their access to non-bank sources of finance, which would imply that lending to them should respond more strongly than lending to enterprises if credit frictions are relevant. Küppers (2001) also tests for differences in the response of lending to households and to firms, but finds that the result depends on the specification of the VAR model, in particular whether both sectors are included in a single VAR or whether separate VAR models are estimated for each sector.
Given the inconclusiveness of the existing evidence, there seems to be scope for a reassessment of these issues for an updated sample. In the following, we investigate whether impulse responses of lending by different German banking groups and lending to different types of borrowers are heterogeneous and whether the differences, if any, may be associated with differences in size. In contrast to the existing evidence, which focuses exclusively on the transmission of monetary policy, our framework also allows us to assess differences in the dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply shocks. We also attempt to improve on some shortcomings of the earlier studies. First, our sample period keeps the disinflation of the early 1980s from affecting the estimation results. 22 Second, in order to keep the structural shocks invariant to the inclusion of loan subaggregates in the analysis, we follow Peersman and Smets (2003) and, respectively, add one loan subaggregate to the baseline VAR as a block-exogenous variable. If we estimated a separate VAR for each loan subaggregate instead, each VAR would yield a different set of shocks, so that the impulse responses would not be directly comparable.
The analysis is therefore performed by extending the baseline model analyzed above to read as follows:
where Z t denotes a certain loan subaggregate and is a scalar, and
determine the extent to which the loan aggregate is affected by the lags of the variables included in our baseline model and its own lags. The instantaneous impacts of the structural shocks w t are given by the N-dimensional vector a, andũ zt denotes the reduced-form residual of the Z t equation after removing the impact of w t .
The data series used in the analysis are displayed in Figures 10 and 11 . The loan subaggregates have been converted to real terms using the GDP deflator (2000 5 100), so that the displayed series show the outstanding stock of loans in terms of 2000 euros. Figure 10 reveals that there have been noteworthy differences in the development of loans to the private sector across banking groups. 23 Since 2000, real credit creation by savings banks, credit cooperatives and Landesbanks flattened, while there was essentially no change in the trend of lending by regional banks. In contrast to this, the outstanding real stock of loans by the large banks decreased dramatically between 2000 and 2005. There are also interesting differences in the development of real lending by sector, displayed in Figure 11 . While real lending to households 22. Admittedly, in return, we catch another caveat due to the start of EMU in 1999 with the handover of monetary control from the Bundesbank to the European Central Bank. If one aims at exploiting times-series observations up to the present, however, this is an inevitable problem that also applies to other studies. Peersman (2005) , for example, also carries out his VAR analysis for the euro area based on a period covering the two monetary policy regimes. 23. We do not report graphs and impulse response functions for the branches of foreign banks and the cooperative central banks, as these two groups account for only a negligible share of total lending business. The results for these banking groups are, however, available on request.
flattened after 2000, but continued to grow, lending to enterprises and selfemployed fell in real terms after 2000. We start by investigating differences in the responses of lending by the different banking groups. The results are reported in Figure 12 . For comparison, we also show the impulse response of total bank loans in each graph. 24 The graphs reveal that the main result of this exercise is that lending 24. We also computed confidence bands for the differences between responses of subaggregates and the benchmark. Those are not reported here, but are available on request. by the large banks tends to respond much stronger to all three macroeconomic shocks than aggregate lending, while the responses of lending by the other banking groups yield mixed results. Thus, there is no evidence supporting the view that lending by banking groups characterized by smaller average institution sizes responds more strongly to shocks than aggregate lending. This result is consistent with the findings of Küppers (2001) . Next we assess whether there are differences in the impulse responses of loans to households, enterprises and self-employed persons. The results are reported in Figure 13 . The graphs suggest that there is no significant difference between the responses of the three sectoral aggregates and aggregate lending is negligible. In particular, there is no evidence that lending to self-employed responds systematically stronger than lending to the other two sectors. Thus, there is also no evidence that the borrowers' size affects how their borrowing responds to macroeconomic shocks.
Finally, we also perform a combined test of the size hypothesis by investigating the impulse response of lending by the different banking groups to the three different types of borrowers. The results are displayed in Figures  14-16 and also do not support the size hypothesis: they do not suggest that lending by smaller credit institutions, i.e. regional banks, savings banks and especially credit cooperatives, to smaller firms, i.e. self-employed persons, responds more strongly to macroeconomic shocks than aggregate loans. These results must, however, not be interpreted as clear evidence against the existence of an active bank lending channel. As we have argued in the introduction, the positive link between borrower and lender size and the relevance of credit market frictions conjectured by the bank lending channel literature may, in Germany, be superimposed by the effects of close borrowerlender relationships, close interbank links and a lack of profit-maximizing behavior on the side of public banks and credit cooperatives. The finding that the response of loan subaggregate is not supportive of the size hypothesis must therefore not be interpreted as evidence against the existence of an active bank lending channel, but rather as evidence against borrower and lender size as a proxy for the relevance of credit market frictions, which was also one of the conclusions of the Eurosystem MTN (Ehrmann et al., 2003) .
CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes the dynamic response of aggregate bank lending to the private non-bank sector and of economic activity to aggregate supply, demand and monetary policy shocks in Germany and the euro area based on a standard macroeconomic VAR using sign restrictions to identify the structural shocks. The impulse response analysis reveals that, with the exception of the response to the supply shock in Germany, the response of loans to the three macroeconomic shocks is rather weak and in most cases insignificant. From a theoretical point of view, this can be explained by mutually offsetting effects of macroeconomic shocks on credit demand, close borrower-lender relationships, the so-called Hausbankenprinzip in Germany and many other euro-area countries, which may induce banks to isolate their customers from macroeconomic fluctuations. Variance decompositions suggest that supply, demand and monetary policy shocks can explain the bulk of the variations in output, prices, interest rates and loans in the two economies. Supply shocks are found to be the dominant factor driving the variation of output and loans in Germany. In the euro area, the contribution of supply and demand shocks to the forecast error variances is in general smaller, while that of the monetary policy shock is higher. Historical decompositions reveal that the credit slowdown and the recent weak economic performance in Germany were primarily driven by adverse supply shocks. The historical decompositions of the loan series further show that the marked slowdown in credit creation in Germany over the last few years actually represents a realignment of the outstanding stock of loans with its deterministic level. The more recent dynamic evolution of output, prices, interest rates and loans was also in the euro area to a large extent shaped by the effect of supply shocks. In order to assess the role of loans in the transmission and amplification of macroeconomic shocks, we perform counterfactual simulations and analyze the dynamic responses of German loan subaggregates in order to test the distributional implications of potential credit market frictions. The results suggest that there is barely evidence that loans significantly amplify the transmission of macroeconomic fluctuations. The weak evidence regarding the importance of a generalized 'financial accelerator' via bank lending in Germany and the euro area may be attributed to both close interbank links and networks and close, long-term relationships between borrowers and lenders (Hausbankenprinzip), which mitigate the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on bank lending and the role of credit market frictions (Ehrmann et al., 2003; . 25 However, it is important to stress that this 25. This would suggest that the strength of the 'financial accelerator' in a country depends on the institutional structure of its financial system. However, the respective cross-country evidence is mixed. Within the Eurosystem MTN, the strength of the 'financial accelerator' was inter alia analyzed on the basis of firm-level data used to estimate whether the investment expenditure of a firm depends on its liquidity -or more specifically, on its cash flow -which should not be the case if financial markets are perfect, that is, if a 'financial evidence must not be strictly interpreted as clear evidence against the existence of an active bank lending channel in Germany and the euro area, but may as well just reflect the pervasive difficulties to disentangle it. In any case, recent developments in euro-area banking sectors and capital markets point to a weakening of any credit channel effects (see e.g. Hofmann and Worms, 2008 , and the references therein). The growing importance of corporate bond markets improves the funding opportunities of non-financial corporations and reduces their dependence on bank loans. The improved funding opportunities for banks in the wake of the dynamic development of securitization markets in the euro-area countries in recent years are another noteworthy development that may matter in this context. Securitization enables financial institutions to transform their illiquid assets, such as loans, accelerator' is absent. Chatelain et al. (2003) report that the MTN results point to a significant but relatively small effect of liquidity on firm investment for France, Germany, Italy and Spain, with the elasticity being lowest for Germany (which is in line with our result). However, in a comparable exercise, Bond et al. (2003) find that the sensitivity of investment to financial variables is more significant in the United Kingdom than in Belgium, France or Germany -a result that is consistent with differences in the financial systems of these countries. Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) also find that the investment of UK firms is more sensitive to cash flow than that of German firms. However, they cannot trace this difference back to differences in the financial systems.
into tradable securities. The ability to securitize loans gives financial institutions access to additional funding sources, so that their funding ability is less likely to be constrained in the event of an adverse macroeconomic shock. As a result, a possible 'financial accelerator' effect via bank lending is also likely to lose importance as securitization markets continue to evolve.
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On the other hand, however, it is often conjectured that the close borrower-lender relationships, which have been emphasized above as one potential explanation for the sluggish response of lending to macroeconomic fluctuations and the weak evidence of the existence of a 'financial accelerator' via bank lending in Germany and the euro area, could become less important in the future if the financial system becomes more market-oriented (see e.g. Elsas and Krahnen, 2004) , which might partly offset the direct effects of improved funding opportunities described earlier.
APPENDIX A
The rotation matrix R has to be chosen such that the identifying restrictions specified above are satisfied. Any four-dimensional rotation matrix can be parameterized as follows: To explore the shock space systematically, we vary the rotation angles y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 , y 5 and y 6 between 0 and p and fix them so that the imposed restrictions are satisfied. For a reasonably large number of grids, more than one rotation satisfies our restrictions. We give equal probability to all of them and, in this case, draw and keep one randomly. 27 In order to account for the uncertainty involved in the estimation of the VAR model, we construct confidence bands by means of the bootstrap-afterbootstrap techniques based on Kilian (1998) . These techniques allow us to remove a possible bias in the VAR coefficients that can arise due to the small sample size of the VAR model (for details on the bootstrap, see Kilian, 1998) . Most draws deliver not just one, but a set of shocks that all satisfy the restrictions. In this case, we follow Peersman (2005) and draw and save one of them. Some draws, however, do not deliver any shocks satisfying the restrictions. We draw until we have saved 500 shocks, which required 16.028 draws for Germany and 3.309 draws for the euro area. 28 
